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LegislatureMay Set Aside CourtApproved Stipulated Judgment
In December 1990, three individual
plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all
those similarly situated, filed a complaint
against defendants for injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, and in the alternative, for peremptory writ of mandate,
challenging the adequacy of the County's
general relief grant of $312 per month,
which they had been receiving since June
1, 1989. Among other things, the complaint alleged that no evidence was presented to the County in 1989 or 1990 to
support the maintenance of the $312 per
month grant level, which had not changed
since 1988; representatives of plaintiffs'
class had presented evidence that the grant
for a single person should be increased to
at least $420 per month; the County arbitrarily and capriciously declined to adjust
the monthly grant allowances in 1989 and
1990, failed to conduct any study or survey, and failed to make any accurate, objective, or factual determinations as to the
actual costs of minimum subsistence in
the County; the County's failure to increase the monthly grant constituted a violation of mandatory duties under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 17000; and
the County's failure to provide an adequate monthly allowance for shelter has
rendered and continues to render many
general relief recipients homeless.
In June 1991, the parties executed a stipulation for settlement and entry ofjudgment;
on July 24, 1991, the Los Angeles County
Superior Court approved the settlement
agreement, and on July 30, 1991, the court
ordered entry of the stipulated judgment.
Among other things, the agreement provided that for each fiscal year from July 1,
1991, through June 30, 1996, the general
relief monthly cash grant for a single-person
household shall be the greater of $341 per
month or the monthly amount for a singleperson household under the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.
As part of the agreement, the plaintiffs
waived their rights to receive retroactive
general relief benefits for the fiscal years
1989-90 and 1990-91. The agreement also
provided that nothing in the agreement
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"shall prohibit defendants from implementing any other policies or practices
relating to the general relief program required by changes in state or federal law.
In the event that the California State Legislature abolishes all obligations under
Welfare and Institutions Code, section
17000, or takes control of or otherwise assumes the County's obligations under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 17000,
the terms of this judgment will automatically
expire."
On August 19, 1992, just days before
the end of the legislative session, the
legislature completely revised AB 2883which previously had nothing to do with
the subject of welfare entitlements-to
provide that the legislature finds and declares "that there is a fiscal emergency that
affects the ability of counties to provide
welfare services in the state." AB 2883
authorized "specified counties to reduce
respective levels of general assistance in
accordance with the relative cost of housing in the counties." Also, the bill declared
"that the provisions of any agreement, including a court-ordered stipulated judgment, requiring a county to provide general assistance grants above the levels required under a specified provision, are
null and void." No member or committee
of the Assembly is listed as the author of
those amendments; Governor Wilson signed
the urgency measure on September 14,
1992.
In October 1992, plaintiffs filed motions to enforce the stipulated judgment
and for a permanent injunction; plaintiffs
alleged that defendants, in reliance on AB
2883, proposed cutting the single-person
general grant from $341 to $299. Plaintiffs
contended that the terms of the stipulated
judgment should be enforced without regard to AB 2883, which they alleged was
unconstitutional as applied to the judgment on the grounds that the statute violated the separation of powers clause of
the California Constitution, and the prohibition against impairment of contracts in
the federal and state constitutions. On December 14, 1992, the trial court denied
plaintiffs' motions.
On appeal, the Second District Court
of Appeal rejected both of plaintiffs' contentions. Regarding the impairment of
contract claim, the court acknowledged
that, in a stipulated judgment, litigants
voluntarily terminate a lawsuit by assenting to specified terms, which the court
agrees to enforce as a judgment, and that
stipulated judgments bear the earmarks
both of judgments entered after litigation
and contracts derived through mutual
agreement. However, the court that decided that "[b]oth prior to and after the
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stipulated judgment in this case, there was
no statutorily authorized contractual relationship between the plaintiffs and defendants." Further, the court held that even if
the judgment did constitute a contract
within the constitutional contract clauses,
no obligation therein can be deemed to
have been impaired by AB 2883 because
of the language in the stipulated judgment
which provided that the terms in the judgment "will automatically expire" in the
event that the legislature "takes control of
or otherwise assumes the County's obligations under Welfare and Institutions Code,
section 17000." According to the Second
District, by enacting AB 2883, the legislature took control of the County's general
relief obligations, thus expiring the terms
of the stipulated judgment.
Plaintiffs also contended that AB 2883
"represents an impermissible legislative
encroachment upon judicial authority in
contravention of the separation of powers
doctrine under the California Constitution," because the legislation discarded "a
final judgment of the court." Plaintiffs argued that under Mandel v. Myers, 29 Cal.
3d 531, 547 (1981), the state constitution
assigns the resolution of specific controversies to the judicial branch of government and provides the legislature with no
authority to set itself above the judiciary
by discarding the outcome or readjudicating the merits of statutes which have secured final passage by the legislature; in
the words of the California Supreme Court,
"Ulust as the courts may not reevaluate the
wisdom or merits of statutes which have
secured final passage by the legislature, the
legislature enjoys no constitutional prerogative to disregard the authority of final
court judgments resolving specific controversies within the judiciary's domain."
Faced with this language, the Second
District announced that plaintiffs "fail[ed]
to establish that the instant stipulated
judgment constituted a 'final judgment'
for purposes of the separation of powers
doctrine." Instead, the court decided that
"the judicial authority embodied in the
stipulated judgment was the authority to
enforce a particular statute," and held that
the court must be free to modify the terms
of a consent decree when a change in law
brings those terms in conflict with statutory objectives. Accordingly, the Second
District affirmed the trial court's order.
In a strong dissent, Justice Earl Johnson stated that, "[in my opinion, what
happened here is an affront to the integrity
and independence of the judicial branch of
government as much as it is a breach of
faith with the destitute citizens who put
their trust in a contract with Los Angeles
County. In a single stroke, the county and
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state government managed to violate two
fundamental constitutional provisionsseparation of powers and the contract
clause." Justice Johnson did not hesitate
to find that the stipulated agreement constituted a contract between the County
government and plaintiffs for purposes of
the contracts clause, stating that the settlement and judgment constituted a contract
to pay money; specifically, the County
agreed to pay a sum equal to $341 a month
(or the AFDC payment level if it is higher)
times the number of eligible general relief
recipients for a five-year period in order to
avoid the imposition of an injunction requiring it to conduct subsistence studies
and adjust grant levels upward during
those same five years. Justice Johnson
also explained how all of the required
elements of a contract are present: the
agreement represented a meeting of two or
more minds; both sides provided sufficient
consideration; and the agreement called for
the parties "to do or not to do certain acts."
Justice Johnson further opined that "[i]f
there ever was a judgment which was the
substantial equivalent of a settlement agreement-and a contract within the meaning of
the contract clause-this is the one."
Johnson also agreed that the legislation
declaring the existing judicial judgment
null and void is unconstitutional as a violation of separation of powers. According
to Johnson, "[t]he ink was barely dry on
the judgment incorporating the settlement
agreement between the county and appellant welfare recipients when the county
began lobbying the state legislature to get
it out of the promises it made in that agreement. Lobbyists for the same board of
supervisors which had authorized and participated in the negotiations that produced
the agreement sat down with legislators
and their staffs and devised legislation
which declared that the agreement was
'null and void."' According to Johnson,
legislation purporting to nullify an existing court judgment violates separation of
powers and is itself null and void.
Johnson concluded his powerful dissent by opining that "this is neither a difficult nor a close case. If the contract clause
means anything, it means government cannot settle litigation with promises of future
payments and then enact legislation reneging on those promises. And if separation of powers means anything it means
the legislature may not declare the judicial
branch's existing judgments to be 'null
and void."'

McDonald v. Superior Court
of San Diego County, Bechtel

Construction Company, et al.,
Real Parties in Interest,
22 Cal. App. 4th 364,
94 D.A.R. 1735,
No. D019854 (Feb. 9, 1994).
Court Must Consider
Litigants' FinancialCondition
Before Referring Discovery
Disputes to PaidReferees
In this proceeding, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal considered whether the
trial court abused its discretion when it
ordered all discovery disputes in a pending case to be heard by a private referee
with the parties to split the fees equally.
Plaintiff contended that the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to consider
the financial impact of its reference order
on her; alternatively, plaintiff argued that
even if the court considered her financial
status, it erred in allocating payment of
any fees to her because, in her opinion, she
was equivalent to an in forma pauperis
plaintiff.
Initially, the court found that, for whatever reason, plaintiff chose not to proceed
in the litigation in informa pauperis status; according to the court, plaintiff cannot
now claim that she should be entitled to
the treatment afforded to in forma pauperis plaintiffs.
Next, the Fourth District considered
whether the trial court was required to consider plaintiff's financial condition as set
forth in her declaration in making its decision and, if so, whether it did consider her
financial condition. The Fourth District
found that the initial order referring discovery matters to Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Services, Inc. (JAMS) for resolution,
with costs to be borne equally by the parties,
was made on the court's own motion apparently without information on plaintiff's financial status. By way of a declaration under
penalty of perjury, plaintiff then informed
the court of her financial condition and its
impact upon her ability to pursue the litigation if she were required to pay referee fees.
After reviewing the evidence presented by
plaintiff, the Fourth District concluded that
the trial court abused its discretion by its
apparent failure to consider plaintiff's declaration in determining how discovery disputes should be handled. Thus, the Fourth
District held that "whenever the issue of
economic hardship is raised before the commencement of the referee's work, the referring court must determine a fair and reasonable apportionment of reference costs before
issuing its order."
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The appellate court explained that the
legislature, by providing for discovery
disputes to be referred to paid referees,
intended to reduce the extensive burden
on trial courts occasioned by discovery
disputes. However, the court found that
"the interests of the court must be balanced against the economic hardship imposed on litigants. It was therefore incumbent upon the trial court to consider the
financial impact of a reference on [plaintiff] in determining how fees should be
paid in a fair and reasonable manner" consistent with statutory provisions.

North County Parents
Organization for Children With
Special Needs v. California
Department of Education,
23 Cal. App. 4th 144,
94 D.A.R. 3224,
No. D016698 (Mar. 10, 1994).
Agency May Recover Only the
Direct Costs of Duplication
in Providing Copies of
PublicDocuments
Pursuant to the California Public Records Act, Government Code section 6250
et seq., appellant-a nonprofit group which
provides advisory services to parents of children with disabilities-requested that respondent Department of Education (DOE)
provide it with copies of all decisions rendered in the preceding two-year period.
DOE charged $0.25 per page for furnishing
the copies, rendering a total bill of $126.50;
this charge covered not only the cost of
duplicating the documents, but also reimbursed DOE for staff time involved in
searching the records, reviewing records for
information exempt from disclosure under
law, and deleting such exempt information.
DOE refused to reduce or waive the charge,
contending that it was not authorized to do
so; appellant paid the fee and brought this
action. The trial court found for DOE, finding that Government Code section 6257 permits DOE to charge "the full direct costs of
duplication," and that DOE's charge of
$0.25 per copy "was not in contravention of
section 6257." The trial court also held that
DOE had discretion to waive fees but did not
err by refusing to consider a waiver in this
case.
On appeal, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal found fault with both of the trial
court's holdings. The court noted that section 6257 provides that one who requests
copies of public documents must pay the
statutory fee for same, if there is one;
lacking a statutory fee, as in this case, the
23
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cost chargeable is a fee covering the direct
costs of duplication. According to the court,
"[t]here seems to be little dispute as to what
'duplicate' means. It means just what we
thought it did, before looking it up: to make
a copy." Since a statute is to be interpreted
according to the usual, ordinary import of
the language employed in framing it, the
court concluded that "the cost chargeable by
the Department for furnishing these copies
is the cost of copying them." The court
further explained that because the statute
provides for the "direct cost" of duplication,
the legislature obviously excluded the "indirect" costs of duplication, "which presumably would cover the types of costs the
Department would like to fold into the
charge." Thus, the court concluded that the
"direct cost of duplication is the cost of
running the copy machine, and conceivably
also the expense of the person operating it.
'Direct cost' does not include the ancillary
tasks necessarily associated with the retrieval, inspection and handling of the file
from which the copy is extracted."
Turning to the waiver issue, the Fourth
District agreed with the trial court's finding that an agency is authorized to waive
or reduce its fees. However, the trial court
found no obligation to reduce the fee, and
thus found no actionable wrong by DOE.
The Fourth District took exception to this
ruling, noting that DOE declined to exercise discretion, contending it had none. According to the appellate court, "[h]ad the
Department been aware that it was vested
with discretion to reduce the fee, it might
have done so." Accordingly, the Fourth District, ordered that the matter be remanded to
DOE "with instructions to consider (but not
necessarily to grant) the request for fee
waiver."
The California Supreme Court denied
DOE's petition for review on May 19.

Powers v. City of Richmond,
23 Cal. App. 4th 787,
94 D.A.R. 3839,
No. A056310 (Mar. 23, 1994).
ConstitutionallyProvided
'Appellate Jurisdiction'Does Not
Prevent Legislature From Limiting
Review to An ExtraordinaryWrit
In this proceeding, the First District
Court of Appeal considered the constitutionality of a provision in the California Public
Records Act, Government Code section
6250 et seq., which limits appellate review
of cases brought under the Act to an extraordinary writ. Section 6259(c) of the Act provides that, in actions "filed on or after Janu-
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ary 1, 1991, an order of the court, either
directing disclosure by a public official or
supporting the decision of the public official refusing disclosure, is not a final judgment or order within the meaning of section 904.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
from which an appeal may be taken, but shall
be immediately reviewable by petition to the
appellate court for the issuance of an extraordinary writ." Appellants contended that section 6259(c)'s preclusion of appeal violates
Article VI, section II of the California Constitution, which provides in part that "courts
of appeal have appellate jurisdiction when
superior courts have original jurisdiction and
in other causes prescribed by statute." Article VI, section 10, provides in part that courts
of appeal have original jurisdiction in proceedings for extraordinary relief "in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition."
According to the First District, the question turns on whether investing the courts of
appeal with "appellate jurisdiction" provides a right to "appeal," or only permits
appellate review in the mode specified by the
legislature. After tracing the history of Article VI, section I1,
the court concluded that
the term "appellate jurisdiction," as it is used
in Article VI, section 11, "does not provide
a right to appeal and exclude review by
extraordinary writ. Consistent with section
1I,review may be limited to extraordinary
writ if the legislature so provides." At this
writing, the California Supreme Court is
considering Powers' petition for review.

Hi-Top Steel Corporation, et al.,
v. Lehrer, et al.,
24 Cal. App. 4th 570,
94 D.A.R. 5795,
No. B075022 (Apr. 28, 1994).
Competitor'sFalseStatements
to Public Agencies to Delay
Plaintiff'sEntry Into Same
Market Are Actionable
In this proceeding, plaintiffs-scrap
steel exporters who sought to expand their
business to automobile body shredding-alleged antitrust violations against defendants--employees of an auto wrecking yard
with which plaintiffs' new business would
compete, claiming that defendants took a
series of actions which "were designed to
delay plaintiffs' entry into the automobile
body shredding business and disrupt
plaintiffs' business by saddling them with
onerous regulatory and administrative costs
and burdens." According to the court, defendants made false statements to the public and
public officials regarding plaintiffs' pro-

posed automobile body shredding facility;
knew their statements about the increased
environmental impacts of plaintiffs' proposed facility were groundless, based upon
their own plans to install a shredder; and
instituted a baseless appeal of plaintiffs' precise plan of design, prosecuting it without
regard to its merits. In the trial court, defendants asserted immunity from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine; the
trial court granted defendants' motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
The Second District reversed. Under the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, there is no antitrust liability under the Sherman Act for
efforts to influence government which are
protected by the first amendment right to
petition for redress of grievances, even if the
motive behind the efforts is anticompetitive.
However, an exception to the doctrine arises
when efforts to influence government are
merely a sham; such efforts are not protected
by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and are
subject to antitrust liability. The Second District examined the sham exception, which
has been applied to "situations in which a
publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a
mere sham to cover what is actually nothing
more than an attempt to interfere directly
with the business relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act
would be justified." According to U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the sham exception
"encompasses situations in which persons
use the governmental process-as opposed
to the outcome of that process-as an anticompetitive weapon."
The Second District noted that the trial
court "expressed concern that California
courts had never actually applied the sham
exception but only discussed it in dicta." The
Second District had no such hesitation, however, holding that it saw "no impediment to
applying the sham exception in California;
it is not inconsistent with the California Constitution." According to the court, "defendants should not be protected from liability
for their torts if they are not engaged in a
genuine exercise of their constitutional
rights but merely 'shamming' exercise of
those rights in order to injure their competitors." Accordingly, the court held the sham
exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
is applicable in California. Further, the court
rejected defendants' argument that the sham
exception only applies in the adjudicatory
setting, holding that the U.S. Supreme Court
has never limited its application to that setting. As a result, the Second District held that
the trial court erred in granting defendants
judgment on the pleadings.
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